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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record.No. 2335 
DOROTHY STONE BLACKWELL, E·T ALS., 
Plaintiffs in Error, 
versus 
VIRGI:NIA TRUST. COMP.AiNY, ET ALS., 
Defendants in Error. 
PETITION E'OR.APPEAL. 
To the Chief Justice and Associate Ju-stices of the Supreme 
Court of .Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioners, Dorothy Stone Blackwell, Margaret 
Stone Wilkinson and Robert Joseph Stone, respectfully rep-
resent unto your Honorable Court that they are aggrieved by 
a certain decree entered in the Law and Equity Court, Part 
II, of the City of Richmond, Virginia, in a certain cause 
therein depending in the said Court in the Chancery side 
thereof, wherein your petitioners were complainants and 
Virginia Trust Company, a domestic Corporation, Robert 
Ware Stone, John Letcher Stone, Herbert Stone, Marian 
Stone, Wilbur Stone, John Letcher Stone, Jr., and Mary 
Frances Stone, an inf ant, were named defendants. The· said 
decree was entered on the 31st day of May, 1940. 
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THE PLEADINGS. 
The pleadings are contained in the record as follows: The 
bill of complaint. and exhibits thereto, page 1; the answer of 
Robert Ware Stone, joining in the prayer of the bill, page 
18; the aiufwer of Mary lfrances Stone by Stuart A. Eacho, 
her guardian ad liteni and his answer as guardian ad lite·m, 
page 20; and the demurrer of the def end ant, Virginia Trust 
Company, page 23. The defendants John Letcher Stone, 
Herbert Stone, :Marian Stone, Wilbur Stone, and ,John Letcher 
Stone, Jr., each failed to plead, answer or demur and the 
cause was heard and disposed of entirely upon the said bill 
of complaint and its exhibits and the said demurrer of the 
defendant, Virginia Trust Company. 
~'ACTS. 
The facts in this matter are not controverted. Thev are 
stated in the bill of complaint (Record, page 1) . ., The 
2* '' :Memorandum by the Court upon *a Demurrer by the 
Virginia Trust Company" contains a most clear state-
ment of the facts. The part of the said ''Memorandum'' 
which states the case is found on pages 27 to 30, inclusive, 
of the Record. We wish to adopt that statement as a part 
of this petition. 
The present value of the entire trust estate in the posses-
sion of Virginia Trust Company, Trustee, based on market 
value of securities and assessed value of the real estate therein 
included is approximately $53,000.00. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
Your petitioners respectfully submit that the Trial Court 
in the said decree (Record, page 25) erred in denying ac-
celeration of the remainder of your petitioners and the in-
fant defendant, Mary Frances Stone, in refusing to terminate 
the said trust in so far as the part or share of Robert Ware 
Stone is concerned and in refusing to direct the Virg-inia Trust 
Company, Trustee, to pay and deliver over the said part or 
share of the said trust to your complainants and the inf ant 
defendant, Mary Frances Stone, and we hereby assig·n the 
following partic.ulars of error: 
1. The Court erred in holding· that the said remainder is 
contingent and not vested in your petitioners and the infant 
defendant, Mary Frances Stone. 
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2. The Court err~d in holding that the renunciation instru-
ment (Record, page 17) executed by Robert Ware Stone was 
not effective to relinquish, extinguish or elimlnate his life 
right, title, interest or estate. 
3. The Court erred in holding that the remainder of your 
petitioner~ and. the infant defendant, Mary Frances Stone,_ 
did not accelerate upon the execution of the said renuncia-
tion instrument. 
3* * AUTHORITIES RELIED UPON BY PETITIONERS. 
Your petitioners respectfully submit the following authori-
ties to sustain this petition: 
Compton v. Rixey, 124 Va. 548, 98 S. E. 651. 
American Nat. Bank v. Cha.pin, 130 Va. 1, 107 S. E. 636. 
Rowle11 v. American Trnst Company, 144 Va. 375. 
Anthony v. Camden Safe Deposit and Tntst Co., 106 N. J. 
Eq. 41, 148 A. 822. 
Bennet v. Fidelity Union Tr1tst Co., 123 N. J. Eq. 198, 196 
A. 375. 
Botzurn v. Havana Nat. Bank, 367 Ill. 539·, 12 N. E. (2nd) 
203. 
ARGUMENT. 
1. The Court erred in holding that the remainder is con-
tingent and not vested in your petitioners and the infant de-
fendant, Mary Frances Stone. 
The ''Memorandum'' states as a major premise the follow-
ing conclusion: '' The remainder after the particular estate 
of Robert W . .Stone is a contingent one-Contingent in two 
aspects, namely: (a) that he should leave more children than 
the present four now in esse, and (b) that he might survive 
all his issue. '' 
With the exception of Code section 5151, considered here-
inbelow, no authorities are cited to sustain that conclusion. 
·with reference to aspect (a) Minor on Real Property, Vol. 
1. Sec. 7 49, states the law as follows : . 
"Upon a devise or conveyance ·to A for life, remainder to 
A's children,• 4t • such a remainder would seem at first glance 
to be contingent by reason of the uncertainty as to what per-
sons will constitute the class mentioned at the expiration of 
the particular estate. And in fact it is contingent, so long as 
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there are none of the dass in existence, for the *'remainder 
4* is then to persons not in being. 
'' But it is established that all such children, etc., livin,g 
at the testator's death or at the time of the conveyance take 
vested remainders, subject to open up and let in others who 
are subsequently born be/ ore the termination of the pa.rtimtlar 
estate." (Italicized in the text.) 
In view of the weight to which that is entitled and the 
unanimity of the decisions of the same, the citation of addi-
tional authorities is hardly necessary. We submit that that 
conclusion of the Court is clearly untenable. 
The effect of the ruling under aspect (b) is to render it 
impossible for a vested remainder to exist. Obviously no re-
mainder could be constructed in which the taking of posses-
sion by the remainderman is not conditioned upon his sur-
viving the particular tenant or the termination of the p·ar-
ticular estate. The Court's ruling in this particular is con-
trary to authority and reason. Moreover, the law favors 
the vesting of remainders. 
The memorandum of the Court quotes from and strongly re-
lies upon Code section 5151 (referred to as 5153). That stat-
ute was enacted years ago and its only purpose was to change 
the common law rule relative to indefinite failure of issue. 
It .can have no effect upon the vested remaindermen in this 
case. It is clear that all references in the "Deed and Trust 
Agreement'' to the life tenant's dying without issue, and all 
interests contingent thereupon, are substitutionary, secondary 
and alternate. Compton v. Rixey ( sitp,ra) emphatically states 
that a remainder followed by a substitutionary gift "may be 
accelerated under like as a vested remainder". 
We submit that the remainder created by paragraph 7, (b) 
and ( c) of the "Deed and Trust Agreement" is a remainder 
vested in the complainants and the infant defendant, Mary 
Frances Stone, followed by substitutionary gifts (1) to the 
issue of any child of the life tenant who might die· before 
the life tenant, and (2) to the life tenant's brother or his 
children or their issue should the life tenant die without 
5* issue. Compton v. Rixey, •with reference to the ac-
celeration of such a remainder uses the following lan-
guage (paragraph 8 of the Compton opinion): 
"A remainder to a person after a life estate to a third 
person, or if such person he then dead ,to his heirs, is not 
contingent,. but substitutionary, and the mention of his heirs 
is intended to prevent a lapse in the event of the death of the 
remainderman in the life-time of the life tenant, and if the 
\ . 
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particular estate ceases to exist in the life-time of the ten-
ant for life, the remainder of such person may be accelerated 
under like concli tions as a vested remainder.'' 
In Compton v. Rixey, your Honorable Court gave practically 
the exact situation which we have in this case as an illustra-
tion of a vested remainder followed by a substitutionary gift. 
The language of the Court is : 
'' Many of these cases were brought under review by that 
court in 1917 in the case In re Disston's Estate, 257 Pa. 537, 
101 Atl. 804, L. R. A. 1918 B, 62. In that case there was a 
life estate to the wife, with remainder after her death to the 
testator's children, or if any of the children were dead leav-
ing issue, the parent's share was to go to such issue. If no 
issue, to certain nephews and nieces or their issue. The 
court regarded the gift over to the issue of the children or 
to the nephews or nieces as substitutionary. Referring to 
other cases, it said, among other things, that the fact that 
alternate remainders may be provided for in the event of the 
decease of such children in the lifetime of the widow, will 
not take a case out of the general rule, if on a view of the 
whole will or the particular part in question, such alternate 
remainders appear to be merely secondary or substitutionary 
in character. '' 
We submit that the remainder as constructed in this case 
fits perfectly into the above illustration; that the remainder 
is vested in the children of Robert W. Stone; that the gifts 
over to the issue of the children or to the brother of Roh-
6* ert W. Stone, or the brother's children or their issue are 
*merely secondary, alternative or substitutionary in char-
acter and can have no effect to prevent the acceleration -of 
the remainder; and that the Court erred in holding the re-
mainder to be contingent and in denying· acceleration for that 
reason~ · 
2. The Court erred in holding that the renunciation instru-
ment (Record, page 17) executed by Hobert W. Stone was not 
effective to relinquish, extinguish or eliminate his life right, 
title, interest or estate. 
The Court apparently was of opinion that Robert W. ·stone, 
having accepted the benefits of his life right, title or estate 
in the trust could not div~st himself of that title or right ex-
cept by the execution of a deed conveying his particular es-
tate to some specified g-rantee. He construes Code section 
5141 to preclude an extinguishment by deed of renunciation, 
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. surrender or release. vVe submit that the effect given to 
that statute by the ·Court is not in harmony with its purpose. 
The statute is known as the statute of frauds and its purpose 
is to prevent false clamors involving the title to real estate~ 
By its terms it is applicable only to lands. A large part of 
the property in the Stone trust is personal property and the 
Trustee has complete discretion to convert all of it into per-
sonalty without bothering to obtain the consent of the benefi-
ciaries, or having them join in any deed. The cest-ui qite trust 
have no title, legal or equitable, to any specific lands. More-
over, the renunciation instrument bemg under seal is em-
braced within the term "deed" and satisfies the requirements 
of the statute. 
The Trial Court seems to hold that the right or power of 
a life tenant to extinguish or relinquish his particular estate by 
renunciation or disclaimer is restricted to a simple refusal to 
accept the particular estate. Indeed, the Court seems dis.;. 
posed to restrict the whole doctrine of acceleration to the 
statutory right of a widow to renounce a life right devised or 
bequeathed to her by her husband's will and to take in 
7* lieu thereof the benefits allowed .*her by law. A large part 
of the law invloving acceleration of remainders has been 
enunciated in cases where the widow elected to renounce her 
husband's will, obviously because the expediency of and ne-
cessity for renunciation arose more frequently in that situa-
tion. But where has the rig·ht of renunciation or surrender 
and the consequent acceleration of vested remainders ever 
been restricted either directly or by reasonable implication to 
that situation? The Court cites no authority to support that 
most technical conclusion. 
The case of. Conipton v. Rixey involved the renunciation by 
a widow of the life estate devised to her hy her husband's 
will. However, in that case she had accepted the provisions 
of the will and had enjoyed the benefits of her particular 
estate for seven years. 1She, therefore, occupied the same 
position as any other life tenant in so far as her right of re-
nunciation or surrender was concerned and her status, in that 
respect, was the same as that of the life tenant in this case. 
Your Honorable Court had the opportunity to adjudicate 
that the renunciation in that case was not effective to ex-
tinguish or relinquish the particular estate, and that the act 
of renunciation was itself ineffective to produce acceleration 
of the remainder, on the ground that Mrs. Rixey having ac-
cepted the life estate could not divest herself of it bv re-
nunciation. That was the position taken by the Con.rt in 
this case. However, in Compton. v. Rixey, acceleration was 
denied solely because the remainder was contingent. The ef-
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fectiveness of the renunciation instrument was not questioned. 
To our mind, the Court af firmcd the effectiveness of the re-
nunciation. This is shown by the following excerpts from 
the opinion (paragraph 2): "The widow relinquished the 
provisions made for her by her husband's will * * * , '' and 
(paragraph 11) ''He has made his own will and no relin-
quishment by Mrs. R.ixey of what was given her can change 
the direction given by :Mr. Rixey of the residue of his es-
tate". The trouble was inherent in the structure of the re-
mainder, which created contingent interests rather than 
8* substitutionary provisions, and not in the particular *es-
tate nor in the renunciation thereof. It is apparent, from 
the opinion, that had the remainder in this case been before 
the Court in Compton v. R-ixey, acceleration would have been 
accorded. 
The courts have iterated and reiterated that the accelera-
tion of remainders is dependent upon the intention of the 
testator or grantor. This matter of intention has, we think, 
been drawn from the lang·uage used in constructing the re-
mainder and not from the structure of the particular estate 
or any intention manifested with reference to the particular 
estate. We submit that it would be manifestly absurd to say 
that a testator or grantor while creating a life estate for the 
benefit of A, did not intend that such estate should continue 
during A's entire lifetime. In other words, if the intention · 
relative to the particular estate were pertinent or controlling 
in determining whether it was intended that the remainder 
should accelerate or not, it is difficult to see how the doc-
trine of acceleration ever developed or how the same could 
obtain in any ordinary case. The trial Court, therefore, 
erred in considering· in this case that the structure of the par-
ticular estate manifested an intention that the particular es-
tate and the trust should continue throug·hout the life-time of 
Robert 1..V. Stone, and upon that ground to hold that the re-
mainder should not accelerate. 
The defendant, Virginia Trust Company, by its demurrer, 
relies solely on its contention that the equitable life estate 
of Robert 1..V. Stone, and the trust, created for his benefit are 
fundamentally indestructible during the lifetime of Ur . 
.Stone. This contention is based entirely upon the so-called 
spendthrift trust provision. It would seem certain that this 
contention could not bave been maintained prior to the 1919 
revision of the Code, embraced in Code section 5157, for up 
to tl1at time spendthrift trusts were illegal in this state. That 
section, while retaining· the languag·e prohibiting spendthrift 
trusts, by a proviso, accords them limited validity for pur-
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poses specified in the act. Public policy is still set against 
9* them for all *other purposes. But even in states which 
favor spendthrift trusts they are not considered inde-
structible. ln the very recent case of BofzU1n v. Havana Na-
tional Ba.nk,. 367 Ill. 539, 12 N. E·. (2nd) 203, the Supreme 
·Court of Illinois permitted the destruction of a trust contain-
ing the strongest spendthrift provision, in spite of the most 
determined opposition by the truste.e. The position of the 
trustee Bank was expressed in the opinion as follows : 
"Although willing to have the trust terminated, the trustee 
has appealed to protect the trust and to protect itself against 
claims of persons who, it says, have contingent interests.'' 
The court held that there were no contingent interests in-
volved and that the trust should be terminated. In that case 
the particular estate, containing the spendthrift trust was 
extinguished at the request of the life tenant made in the 
pleadings. If she could do· that, could she not extinguish by 
formal renunciation? The trust was created by a deed and 
trust agreement, as in this case, which transferred all the 
title of the grantor to the trustee in trust for the purposes 
specified. 
The Virginia Trust Company in this case takes the strange 
- position that since the grantor is dead a duty rests upon it 
to carry out what it considers to be the wishes of the deceased. 
In this case, as in the Botzum case, the '' Deed and Trust 1 
AgTeement" conveys all the title of the g-rautor to the trus-
tee. If any right in the property conveyed or power over 
the trust created had remained in the grantor at the time of 
her death, that right and power descended to her heirs and 
not to the trustee. The defendant trust company owes no 
duty except to the quick, pursuant to the terms of the in-
strument creating the trust. We submit that this p·osition of 
the trustee is silly moralizing·, desig·ued to cloak a desire to 
hold on to the corpus of the trust. 
If in the Botzum case the particular tenant had been pre-
. eluded from divesting herself of the particular estate 
10* or extinguishing the same, by *reason of the acceptance 
of the benefits thereof over a period of many years or 
by reason of the spendthrift trust, how could the trust have 
been terminated during her lifetime? Could the fact that 
the grantor of the trust was still alive have any ·bearing upon 
the right, title or power of the particular tenant to divest her-
self of the particular estate or to extinguish the same? That 
case seems to parallel this case in respect (a) to the struc-
ture of the particular estate and (b) to the creation of al-
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ternate, secondary and substitutionary provisions in the struc-
ture of_ the remainder. If that trust were destructible, can 
this f,rust be indestructible? 
We submit that all of the textbook statements which mav 
seemingly indicate that where the cest'U:i que trust has accepted 
the provisions of_ the trust, he is precluded from disclaiming 
or renouncing the same, are only applicable to cases where 
the whole beneficial interest or the fee simple equitable title· 
is vested in the annuitant, upon conditions set forth in the 
trust arrangement, or where there is a life beneficial interest 
followed by contingent interests in remainder, which cannot 
be determined until the physical death of the life beneficiary. 
Upon examination, it may be found that those vague text 
statements in no case apply where, as in this case, there is 
a life beneficial interest preceding a vested remainder or a 
vested remainder followed by a substitutionary gift. In Co-,nv-
ton v. Rixey, Anthony v. Ca.mden Safe Devos-it and Trnst Co., 
Bennet v. Fidelity Union Tritst Co., Rowley v. Anierican 
Tr11,st Co., Botzwni v. Hwvwna National Ba·n-k and A11wricm1, 
National Bank v. Chapin. ( all cited above on page 3 of this 
petition) the right and power of the life tenant to relinquish 
or extinguish his life estate,, by renunciation, release or sur-
render, and thereby cause the acceleration of the remainder 
or the termination of the trust and acceleration of its distri-
bution where the remainder is vested or is followed bv a substi-
tutionary gift, is clearly upheld. Those cases cleariy repudi-
ate any said vague text statements and the conclusions 
11 * of the trial court in this particular. Moreover, *we sub-
mit that the courts generally are becoming more, rather 
than less, liberal in the destruction of restrictions upon the 
free use and disposition of property. 
3. The Court erred in holding that the remainder of your 
petitioners and the infant defendant, l\fary Frances Stone, 
did not accelerate upon the execution of the said renuncia-
tion instrument. 
This conclusion of the Court is based upon his finding of an 
intention that the remainder shall not accelerate and that in-
tention is drawn entirely from the lang·uage used in construct-
ing the particular estate of Robert Ware Stone. As stated 
above, it would seem that wherever a life estate has been 
created, the intention is thereby manifested, as strongly as it 
can be manifested, that the same shall continue throug·hout 
the lifetime of the life tenant. Is it then possible to acld to 
or reinforce that intention by appending· a so-called spend-
thrift trust provision in the form of a condition subsequent? 
Since the Court says that the law of spendthrift trusts is in-
---, 
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volved only to a "slight extent", we take it that the Court 
does not hold that the spendthrift trust provision precludes 
Robert W. Stone from exting·uishing his particular estate and 
thus terminating· the trust by acceleration of the remainder, 
by merg·er or by agreement with the remaindermen. That , 
view is not even recognized in Illinois where, · according to 
Corpus Juris, spendthrift trusts are favoted. See Botzwm, 
v. Havana National Bank (sitpra). How much more unten-
able must it be in Virginia! Thus the Court arg·ues that the 
spendthrift trust provision manifests an intention that the 
re11iainder shall not accelerate. But by the very terms of the 
'' Deed and Trust Agreement'' the spendthrift trust provision 
is applicable only to the particular estate and in no wi~e 
relates to the remainder or to the remaindermen. How can 
it then have any effect upon the rights of your petitioners or 
the infant defendant, Mary Frances Stone? All of the cases 
on acceleration imply that the renunciation by the life tenant -
renders the intention, in so far as the particular estate 
12* is *concerned, nug·atory. Bennet v. Fidelity Union 
Tntst Co. (supra), puts it thus: 
"The testator intended -that the wife should take au estate 
for her life * * * , and that at the end of that life estate the 
corpus should go to those persons whom he specifically desig-
nated in that behalf. The widow, however, cannot be com-
pelled to take the life-estate-nor to keep it even if she does 
take it. If the life-estate which he gave her should be refused, 
or subseq,uently given itp, by her, her life-est.ate is thereby 
terminated prior to her death. His intent that she should 
havo the fund for life is hereby rendered nitgatory. '' (Em-
phasis ours.) 
We, therefore, submit that any intention that the remainder 
shall not accelerate, but must await the physical death of the 
life tenant before it can be enjoyed by the remaindermen, 
must be found in the language creating the remainder. 
Compton v. Ri.xey (supra) puts it thus: 
"The principle underlying this class of cases seems to be 
that wherever it appears that the life tenant and the remain-
derman are sufficiently designated, and it was intended they 
together should take the whole estate, acceleration will be ac-
corded the remainderman whenever the life estate is eliminated 
in any manner whatever, for such must have been the inten-
tion of the testator." 
.A:merica-11 National Bank v. Chapin (supra) states : 
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''Upon examination of the whole will, we are of opinion 
that the postponement of the division of the estate until the 
death of the widow was for the purpose of securing her in-
come during her life, and that when she renounced the pro-
visions of the will * * * the reason for the postponement of 
the period of distribution no longer existed; and it was proper 
to make such distribution as though the ,vidow had died.'' 
The Chapin case further extends the doctrine of accelera-
tion, under some circumstances, to contingent remain-
13* ders, as is shown by the following *statement contained 
in the syllabus: 
"Where it appears that the possession of the remaindermen 
is postponed solely for the benefit of the widow of the testator, 
it is presumably the intention of the testator that her re-
nunciation of the provisions made for her life is equivalent to 
her death, and the beneficaries entitled in remainder 
enter into enjoyment at once, and in the application of this 
principle there is no distinction between vested and contingent 
remainders. '' 
The "Deed and Trust AgTeement'' clearly shows that the 
possession and enjoyment of the remainder of your petitioners 
and the infa,nt defendant, :Mary ~-,ranees Stone, was postponed 
solely for the benefit of the life tenant, Robert W. Stone. We, 
therefore, E\Ubmit that the court erred in denying· acceleration 
upon the renunciation of Robert W. Stone. 
CONCLUSION. 
Your petitioners submit the following conclusions: 
(a) By virtue of the "Deed and Trust Agreement", upon 
the d~ath of Anna Roberta .Stone in the year 1928, Robert 
W. Stone became possessed of a life rig·ht, title, interest or 
estate in his part or share of the trust estate, with remainder 
vested in his children. 
(b) Upon the execution of the renunciation instrument by 
Robert W. Stone, his life right, title, interest or estate was 
terminated and eliminated as effectively as the same would 
be terminated and eliminated bv his death. 
( C) The remainder of your petitioners and the infaiit de-
fendant, Mary Frances Stone, was a vested remainder, the 
alternate provisions being merely substitutionary and sec-
ondary by the terms of the "Deed and Trust 1\.g·reement". 
( cl) By virtue 6f the renunciation of Robert "\V. Stone, the 
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enjoyment of the remainder vested in your petitioners and 
the infant defendant, Mary Frances Stone, have accelerated 
and they are entitled to haye the said trust terminated and the 
corpus thereof paid and delivered over to them. 
14* *Wherefore, and for the reasons above given, your 
petitioners pray that an appeal be granted to the above 
mentioned deeree and that the said decree and this cause be 
reviewed and reversed; that the defendant, Virginia Trust 
Company, be required to terminate the trust in one-half of 
the trust estate, and to pay and deliver over the corpus of 
the same to your petitioners and the infant defendant, Mary 
Frances Stone, or her guardian; and/or that the said cause b~ 
remanded to the Law and 1Equity Court, Part II, of the City 
of Richmond, Virginia, for further proceedings to be had in 
· conformity with the views of your Honorable Court; that the 
defendant, Virginia Trust' Company, be specifically required 
to pay the costs of these proceedings from its own funds and 
not from funds belonging· to the said trust. And your pe-
titioners hereby adopt this petition as their brief and request 
oral argument upon the same before the Court or before a 
Justice thereof. 
WILLI4M OLD, 
Attorney for Petitioners, 
Petersburg, Virginia. 
I, ""iVilliam Old, an attorney practicing· in the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby state that I have examined 
tbe record of this case and am of the opinion that there is 
e1Tor in the said record, and that the said judgment or de-
cree should be reviewed and reversed. 
WILLIAM OLD. 
I hereby aclmowledg·e receipt of a copy of the above peti-
tion as of the 10th day of June, 1940. 
Received June 10, 1940. 
WM. J. McDOWELL, 
Attorney for Defendant, Virginia 
Trust Company. 
M. B: W. 
July 5, 1940. Appeal allowed. Bond $1,500.00. 
EDW. W. HUDGINS. 
Received July 5, 1940. 
· M. B. W. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Honorable Frank T. Sutton, Jr., Judge 
of the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part 
Two, held for the said City at the Courtroom thereof in the 
City Hall on the 31st day of May, 1940. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: At the· Rules 
held in the Clerk's office of the said Law and Equity Court 
of the City of Richmond, Part Two, on the Third Monday in 
Fe.bruary, 1940: Came Dorothy Stone Blackwell, Margaret 
Stone "Wilkinson, and Robert Joseph Stone, by -Counsel and 
filed their Bill against Virgfoia Trust Company, a dornestic 
corporation, Robert vVare 8tone, John Letcher Stone, Her-
bert Stone, Marian Stone, ·wnbur Stone, John Letcher Stone, 
Jr., and Mary Frances Stone, an infant under the age of 21 
years, which Bill is in the words and figures following, to- · 
wit: 
'' Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court, Part II, of the City of 
Richmond. 
Dorothy Stone Blackwell, Marg·aret Stone ·Wilkinson, and 
Robert Joseph Stone, Complainants, 
v. 
Virginia Trust Company, a domestic corporation, Robert 
Ware Stone, John Letcher Stone, Herbert Stone, :Marian 
Stone, ·wnbur Stone, J olm I ~tchcr Stone, Jr., and Mary 
Frances Stone, an infant under the age of 21 years, De-
fendants. 
BILL OF COMPLAINT. 
page 2 ~ To the Honorable Frank T. Sutton, Judge of the 
Law and Equity Court, Part II, of the City of 
Richmond, Virginia : 
Humbly complaining, your complainants, Dorothy Stone 
Blackwell, l\forg·aret _ Stone "'\Vilkinsou, Robert Joseph Stone, 
respectfully showeth unto your Honor, as a basis for the re-
lief hereinafter prayed fo·r, the following case: 
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(1) That the defendant, Robert ·ware Stone, is the son of 
the late Thomas Letcher Stone, deceased, and Anna Roberta 
Stone, deceased, and that your complainants, Dorothy Stone 
Blackwell, Margaret Stone Wilkinson and Robert Joseph 
Stone and the inf ant defendant, l\fary Fran<!es .Stone are all 
of the children of the said Robert ·ware Stone. 
(2) That the said Thomas Letcher Stone, deceased, de-
parted this life on the 11th day of November, 1922, after first 
having· made his last will and testament under date of June 
9th, 1917, with a codicil attached thereto dated May 25th, 
1919, both being· duly probated in the Clerk's Office of the 
Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, .A copy 
of which said last will and testament and the codicil attached 
thereto is attached hereto, marked '' Exhibit A'' and prayed 
to be taken and read as a part of this bill of complaint. 
(3) That pursuant to the terms of the said will a large and 
valuable estate passed to Anna Roberta Stone, widow of the 
said Thomas Letcher Stone. 
( 4) That the said Thomas Letcher Stone, deceased, left 
surviving him his widow, the said Anna Roberta 
page 3 r Stone, now deceased, and two sons, to-wit, the de-
fendants Robert Ware Stone and John Letcher 
Stone. 
( 5) On the 14th day of August, 1924, the said Anna Ro-
berta Stone, now deceased, entered into a certain ''Deed and 
Trust Agreement'' with the defendant, Virginia Trust Com-
pany, by virtue of which she conveyed and transferred to the 
said Virginia Trust Company, upon certain trusts therein set 
forth, certain real and personal property set forth· and de- · 
scribed in the said '' Deed and Trust Ag-reement' ', .A copy of 
the said ''Deed and Trust Agreement" is attached hereto, 
marked "Exhibit B ", and prayed to be taken and read as a 
part of this bill of complaint. 
(6) That the said Virginia Trust -Company has acted as 
trustee under the said '' Deed and Trust Agreement'' from 
the said 14th day of August, 1924, until the present time. 
(7) That under the said "Deed and Trust Agreement'' the 
said Anna Roberta Stone, now deceased, was to receive and 
did receive the net income from the said trust estate until 
the time of her death in 1928. 
(8) That the said ''Deed and Trust Agreement" further 
provided that upon the death of the said Anna Roberta 
Stone, the said defendant, Virginia Trust Company, Trustee, 
should divide all the rest, residue and remainder of said trust 
estate into two equal parts or shares; that the net income aris-
ing· from one such part or share should be paid to the said 
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Robert ·ware Stone, and that the net income arising from the 
other such part or share should be paid to the said 
.page 4 ~ John Letcher Stone; and the said "Deed and Trust 
Agreement'' further provided that upon the death 
of the said Robert ·ware Stone, the said Virginia Trust Com-
pany, Trustee·, should pay and deliver over the principal of 
the part or share of the said Robert Vlare Stone and his chil-
dren, '' discharged of all trust to and anwmz.g his children, 
in equal shares ; the issue of any deceased child of his to take 
the parents share by right of representation''; and that upon 
the death of the said John Letcher Stone, the said Virginia 
Trust Company, Trustee, should pay and deliver over t_he 
principal of the part or share of the said John Letcher Stone 
and his children, '' discharged of all trust to and among bis 
children, in equal shares; the issue of any deceased child 
of his to take the parents share by right of representation''. 
(9) That the children of the defendant, John Letcher 
Stone, are: J olm Letcher Stone, Jr., "\V'ilbur Stone, Herbert 
Stone and Marian Stone, all of whom are over the age of 21 
years. 
(10) That on the 6th day of ,January, 1940, the said Robert 
Ware Stone executed a certain renunciation instrument, un-
der the terms of which he renounced and disclaimed all his 
life rig·ht, title, interest and estate in and to his part or share 
of the said trust. A copy of the said renunciation instrument 
is attached hereto, marked '' Exhibit C'' and prayed to be 
taken and read as a part of this bill of complaint. 
(11) Your complainants aver that the said Virginia Trust 
Company, upon the death of the said Anna Roberta Stone, did 
not divide the said trust in two equal parts or shares as was 
directed and_ req~irc<l by the said '' Deed and Trm;t 
page 5 ~ Agreement" and that the said Virginia Trust Com-
pany has failed to do so up to the present time. 
Your complainants aver that upon the division of the said 
trust in two equal parts or shares, the said part or share of 
the said Robert Ware Stone should be administered ai1d the 
trust terminated and the principal paid and delivered ov~1· 
in accordance with the said "Deed and Trust Agreement" 
without regard to the part or share of the said John Letcher 
Stone or the interests of any persons therein. 
(12) Your complainants further aver that prior to the exe-
cution of the said renunciation instrument bv the said Hobert 
Ware Stone, the said Robert ·ware Stone w~s possessed of a 
life right, title, interest and/or estate in and to his part or 
sl1are of the said trust with remainders vested in vour com-
plainants Dorothy Stone Blackwell, l\fa rg-aret St01ie "Wilkin-
son and Robert Joseph Stone and in the the infant defend-
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imt, Mary Frances Stone; that the said renunciation by the 
said Robert ·ware Stone terminated and/or eliminated the 
said particular estate to which the said vested remainders 
were subject, in the same manner and to the same extent as 
the same would have been terminated and/or eliminated by 
the death of the said Rohert Vv are Stone; and that, therefore, 
and by reason thereof, the said yested remainders have ac-
celerated and under the terms of the said "Deed and Trust 
Agreement'', it has now become and is the duty of the said 
Virginia Trust Company, Trustee, to pay and deliver over the 
principal or corpus of the said part, portion or share of the 
said trust, in equal amounts to your complainants, 
page 6 ~ Dorothy Stone Blackwell, Margaret Stone Wilkin-
son and Robert ,Joseph Stone and to the said in-
f ant defendant, Mary Frances. Stone. 
(13) Your complainants further aver that they have deliv-
ered a copy of the said renunciation instrument to the said 
Virginia Trust Company, Trustee, and have made formal re-
quest or demand upon the said trustee to pay and deliver over 
the principal of the said part, portion or share of the said 
trust in the manner set forth above and idrected by the said 
"Deed and Trust AgTeement". The said Virginia Trust 
Company, Trustee, has wholly failed and refused to comply 
with the said request or demand and still does fail and refuse 
to comply with the same. 
In tender consideration whereof, and forasmuch as your 
complainants are remediless in the premises save in a Court 
of Equity, where alone such matters are properly cognizable, 
your complainants pray that the said Virginia Trust Com-
pany, a corporation org·anized and existing· under the laws 
of Virgfoia, Trustee, Robert vVare Stone, John Letcher Stone, 
John Letcher Stone, Jr., Wilbur Stone, Herbert Sto1ie, Ma-
rion Stone and Mary Frances Stone, an inf ant under the age 
of 21 years, be made parties defendant to this bill of complaint 
and required to answer the same, but not under oath, answers 
under oath being hereby expressly waived; that proper pro-
cess issue; that a guardian ad liteni be duly appointed to rep-
resent the interests of the said infant defendant, :M:ary Fran-
ces Stone; that the said Virginia Trust Company, Trustee, 
be directed, under the supervision of this court, to divide the . 
_ said trust into two equal parts or shares and that 
page 7 ~ one of the parts or shares be designated for the 
benefit of Robert Ware Stone and his children and 
the other part or share be designated for the benefit of J olm 
Letcher Stone and his· children; that a g·uardian for the said 
infant defendant, Mary Frances Stone, be appointed and 
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qualified; that the said Virgfoia Trust Company be directed 
to liquidate the said part or share of the said trust designated 
for the the benefit of the said Robert Ware Stone and his 
children and to pay and deliver over the same in equal shares 
to your complainants, Dorothy Stone Blackwell, Margaret 
Stone Wilkinson and Robert Joseph Stone and to the guard-
ian of the said infant defendant, Mary Frances Stone; that 
all proper inquiries may be directed and accounts taken; and 
that your complainants may be granted all such further, 
other, general and/or specific relief as the nature of their 
case may require or to equity shall seem meet. And as in 
duty bound your complainants will ever pray, etc. 
DOROTHY STONE BLACKWELL, 
MARGARET STONE WILKINSON, 
ROBERT JOSEPH STONE, 
-Complainants. 
WILLIAM OLD, Counsel. 
page 8 ~ ''·EXHIBIT B. '' 
THIS DEED AND TRUST AGREE·MENT, made and en-
tered into this 14th day of August, 1924, by and between Anna 
Roberta Stone, ( widow of Thos. Letcher Stone) of the City 
of Richmond, Va., party of the first part, and the Virginia · 
Trust Company, a corporation, duly organized and existing 
under the laws of the ·State of Va., and having its principal . 
office in the City of Richmond, Va. ( and hereinafter some-
times referred to as the "Trustee") party of the second 
part; 
WHEREAS, the party of the first part desires to relieve 
herself of the care of her estate during her lifetime, and to 
make suitable provision for the preservation and distribution 
thereof after her death and, for such purposes, desires to 
establish a trust upon the conditions and for the uses and pur-
poses hereinafter set forth, 
NOvV, THEREFORE, THIS DEED AND TRUST 
AGR,EEMENT WITiNESSETff: 
That the said Anna Roberta Stone, party of the first part, 
in consideration of the sum of oen ($1.00) dollar, in hand 
paid, and of her love and affection for her children, and of 
her desire to provide and secure for them a competency after 
her death, and of other good and valuable considerations, 
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doth hereby bargain and sell, grant and convey, assign, trans-
fer and set over, unto the said Virginia Trust Company, all 
and every the following mentioned real and personal prop-
erty namely: * * * 
• * 
page 9 ~ PERSONAL PROPERTY. 
All and every those certain real estate secured notes and 
bonds, and United States bonds, and shares of stock, enumer-
ated and listed in a certain "Schedule of Securities", bear-
ing even date herewith, and identified by my signature 
thereto, as well as by the signature thereto of the said Vir-
ginia Trust Company; 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD, all and every the said sev-
eral parcels of real estate, and all and every said personal 
property, unto the said Vfrginia Trust Company, as Trus-
tee, in trust, nevertheless, for the following uses and pur-
poses; 
1. To collect and receive all and every the income, rents, 
issues, and profits, arising and/or derived from said real 
estate and said personal property, and any and all accumu-
lations thereof and, after the payment therefrom of all taxes, 
assessments, insurance premiums, repair and upkeep ex-
penses, and any and all other necessary and proper charges 
and expenses, incident to the management of the trusts hereby 
created, (including a commission to the said Trustee of five 
per cent, upon the gross amount of such income, rents, issues 
and profits, collected or received by it hereunder) to pay over 
to me, the said Anna R. Stone, the balance of the net income, 
not, however, exceeding the sum of two hundred dollars, 
($200.00) per month, for and during the term of my natural 
life; 
2. To permit me, the said Anna R. Stone, to occupy and live 
in the said premises No. 1711 Grove A venue, in the City of 
Richmond, Va., for life, or for so long a time as I may desire 
to do so, free of any rent charge or deduction there-
page 10 ~ for; that is to say: That the said Trustee shall pay 
to me the balance of said net income, not, how-
ever, exceeding the said sum of $200.00 per month, for life 
and, in addition thereto, shall permit me to occupy and live 
in the said premises No. 1711 Grove Avenue, without charge 
or deduction for sucl1 use, so long as I may desire to do so; .. 
and, in the event that said premises shall he sold in my life-
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time, by and with my consent, evidenced by my uniting· in 
the execution of the deed of conveyance, and the proceeds 
of any such sale, or any part of such proceeds, shall be in-
vested in other improved real estate, then to permit me to 
occupy and live in such other parcel of improved real estate, 
should I desire to do so, free of any rent charge or deduction 
therefor, as aforesaid; and provided that all taxes, assess-
ments, insurance premiums, and all repair and upkeep 
charges, on or in respect to said premises, No. 1711 Grove 
A venue, or other parcel of improved real estate in which 
the proceeds of the sale thereof, or any part of such pro-
ceeds, may be invested by said Trustee, as aforesaid, shall 
be paid out of the income arising and/or derived from said 
trust estate; 
3. To permit my sou, Robert W. Stone, to occupy and live 
in the said premises No. 1815 Grove A venue, in the City of 
Richmond, Va., during my lifetime, or for so long a time dur-
ing my life as he may desire to do so, free of any rent charge 
therefor whatsoever; and, in the event that said premises shall 
be sold in my lif etimc, by and with my consent, evidenced by 
my uniting in the deed of conveyance, and the proceeds of 
any such sale, or any part of wuch proceeds shall 
page 11 ~ be invested in other improved real estate, then per-
mit my said son, Robert, to occupy and live in such 
other parcel of improved real estate, during my lifetime, 
should he desire to do so, free of any rent charge the ref or 
whatsoever; and provided that all taxes, assessments, insur-
ance premiums, and all repair and upkeep charges, on or in 
respect to said premises No. 1815 Grove Avenue, or other 
parcel of improved real estate in which the proceeds of tlw 
sale thereof, or any part of wu.ch proceeds, may be invested 
by my said Trustee, as aforesaid, shall be paid out of the in-
come arising and/or derived from said trust estate; 
4. From and out of the principal of said trust estate, and/or 
from and out of accumulated income therefrom arising, to 
pay off and discharge, froni time to time, the principal and 
interest of and on certain debts now owing by me, and ag-
gregating the principal sum of approximately $12,700.00; a 
list and enumeration of said debts being set forth in a cer-
tain "Schedule of Debts", ·bearing even date herewith, .and 
identified by my signature thereto, as well as by the signature 
thereto of the said Virginia Trust ·Company; 
5. To let and relet the said real csta te, and any and all 
parcels thereof, ( except as hereinbefore restricted) and to 
sell or exchange the said real estate, or any or either parcel 
thereof, at any time hereafter, or from time to time, and upon 
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such terms and conditions and in such manner as my said 
Trustee, in its absolute discretion, may deem best; provided, 
however, that in the event of the sale of the premises No. 
1711 Grove A venue, or of the premises No. 1815 Grove Ave-
nue, during my lifetime, my consent thereto shall be first ob-
tained, and evidenced by my uniting in the execution of the 
... de-cd of conveyance thereof; 
page 12 ~ And provided further that, in no event shall the 
lessor or purchaser of any of said parcels of real 
estate be in any wise oblig·ated to see to the proper applica-
tion of the rents or purchase money and/or avails of any 
such sale or exchange of any of said parcels of real estate; 
6. To invest and reinvest the proceeds of any such sale or 
cxcbang~ of real estate, either in other real estate, or in first 
mortgage real estate secured notes; and to either hold in their 
present form of investment and/or to sell, invest and rein-
vest and, from time to time, to change the investment, of said 
personal property, constituting a part of the said trust es-
tate; _ _ 
7. Upon the death of me, and said Anna R. Stone, and after 
the payment of all my just debts and funeral expenses, (in-:-
cluding a commission to my said Trustee of two and one-half 
per cent, (2112%) upon the then value of said entire trust e~~ 
tate) I do direct and require that my said -Trustee, the said 
Virginia Trust Company, shall divide all the rest, rcsiduP 
and remainder of said trust estate into two equal parts or 
shares, and shall have and hold the same, and shall dispose 
of the· income and principal thereof as follows: 
(a) It shall pay over the net income arising from one such · 
equal part or share to my son, John L. Stone, should he sur-
vive me, for and during the term of his natural life, and at 
his death, ( or at my death, should he not survive me) to pay 
and deliver over the principal of such part or share, dis-
. charged of all trust, to and among his children, 
page 13 r in equal shares, the issue of any deceased child of 
his to take the parent's share by right of repre-
sentation; · 
(b) To pay over the net inco.me arising from .the other -
such equal part of share to my son, the said Robert ,V. Stone, 
should he survive me, for and during the term of his natural 
life, and at death, ( or at my death, should he not survive 
me) pay and deliver over the principal of such part or share, 
discharged of all trust, to and among; his children, in equal 
shares; the issue of any deceased child of his to take the 
parent's slmre by rig·ht of representation; 
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( c) And in the event that either of my said sons shoul~ 
die without leaving issue, then I do direct that the share or 
part of said trust estate which otherwise would have been 
paid and delivered over to his issue at his death, as afore-
said, shall, at the death of such son, be paid and delivered 
ove_r, discharged of all trust, to his brother, should his 
brother survive him; and if not, then such share or part shall 
be paid and delivered over, discharged of all trust, to the 
children of such brother, in equal shares ; the issue of any 
deceased child of his to take the parent's share by right of 
representation; 
( d) and I, the said Anna R. Stone, do particularly charge 
and direct, and the right of my said sons respectively to have 
and receive the income provided for them in the foregoing 
trusts is conditioned as follows: That neither of my said 
sons shall assign, anticipate or alienate the said income to 
which they are respectively entitled, under the · preceding 
· trusts, or any part thereof; and that the same shall 
page 14 ~ not be subject to attachment, seizure or sequestra-
tion by their creditors, by a:riy legal process or pro-
cedure whatsoever; and that if, at any time, either of my 
said sous shall attempt to assign, anticipate or alienate said 
income, or any part thereof, or shall become a bankrupt, or 
an attempt shall be made by any creditor of either of my 
said sons to attach, seize or sequetrate said income, then the 
right of such son to receive such income shall thereupon ab-
solutely cease for the remainder of his life, and the said Trus-
tee shall thereupon apply the same for the support, mainte-
nance and benefit of such son, in any · 
manner it may deem best, and the expenditures of the Trus-
tee for such purposes shall not be subject to· dispute or ques-
tion by such son, or uny any person whatsoever; 
8. The said Virgfoia Trust Company, party of the second 
part, hereby accepts the said trusts, and covenants that it 
will execute the same with all due fidelity, it being expressly 
understood and stipulated, however, that it shall not be held 
accountable or liable for any mere error of judgment in the 
execution of said trusts, or any of them; and it is further ex-
pressly understood and stipulated that if, at any time here-
after, it, the said party of the second part, desires to re-
linquish the trusts hereby created, and to be released and re-
lieved therefrom, then, by and with the consent of the said 
narty of the first party, evidenced by a writing under her 
hand and seal, it may re-convey the said real estate (and/or 
Ruch thereof as may not heretofore been sold or exchanged) 
to the said party of the first part, and transfer and deliver 
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over to _her such personal property as may then be 
page 15 ~ held in trust hereunder, and thereupon it, the said 
party of the second part, shall be released and re-
lieved and discharged of and from all further duties and 
obligations- h~reunder; 
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, the said party of the first 
part has hereunto set her hand and seal, and the said party 
of the second part has caused this instrument to be signed in 
its name and on its behalf by its Vice-President, and its cor-
porate seal to be hereunto affixed and attested by its Secre-
tary, the day and year first hereinbefore written: 
Attest: 
(Signed) Ai.\fNA ROBERTA STONE (Seal) 
VIRGINIA TR.UST COl\IPANY 
by 
(Signed) ·wALKE.R SCOT-T 
Vice-President 
(Signed) L. D . .A.YLETT 
Secretary 
State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
I, J. M. Carter, Jr., a Notary Public; within and for the 
City aforesaid, in the State of Virginia, so hereby certify 
that Anna Roberta Stone, whose name is signed and whose 
seal is affixed to the foregoing writing, bearing date the 14th 
day of August, 1924, has ackno,vledg·ecl the same before me, 
in my City aforesaid; and I do further certify that Walke1· 
Scott and L. D. Aylett, whose names, as Vice-President and 
Secretary, respectively, of the said Virginia Trust Companv, 
are sig·ned to fhe foregoing· writing, severally acknowledg;d 
the same before me, in my City aforesaid; and I do 
page 16 ~ fm;{her certify that my term of office expires the 
21st clay of November, 1927. 
Given under my hand this 14th day of August, 1924. 
(Signed) .J. l\L CARTER, JR., 
Notary Public. 
page 17 ~ KNO,Y ALL ME.N BY THESE PRESENTS, 
That I, Robert Ware Stone, son of the late Anna 
Roberta Stone, deceased, for reasons satisfactory to myself 
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and which are known to my children, do hereby forever re-
nounce and disclaim all m, life right, title, interest and estate 
in and to a ·certain trust created by and set forth and con-
tained in a certain ''Deed and !Trust Agreement'' from Anna· 
Roberta Stone to Virginia Trust Company of Richmond, Vir-
ginia, Trustee, bearing date on the 14th day of August, 1924, 
and,all right, title, interest and estate of whatsoever nature, 
whether in law or in equity, which may have been granted 
to me or set up and created for my bene.:fit in and by the said 
"Deed and Trust Agreement". And I do renounce and dis-
claim, forever, each, every and all payment or payments of 
any portion or share of the income of the said trust, or any 
interest therein which may be sought to be paid to me in ac-
cordance with any right, title, interest and/or estate which 
I had or to which I :was entitled at any time before the exe-
cution of this instrument, it being my intention to terminate 
my life right, title, interest and estate in and to the said 
trust and to eliminate any particular estate of whatsoever 
:aature which I may have in the said trust as effectively as 
would my death terminate and eliminate the same. 
In witness whereof, I hereunto set my hand and seal this 
6th day of January, 1940. · 
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Virginia: 
(Signed) ROBERT WARE STONE (Seal) 
(1940 2d February Rules-Filed.)-
In the Law and Equity Court, Part II, of the City of Rich-
mond. 
Dorothy Stone Blackwell, et als., 
v. 
Virginia Trust Company, et als. 
AN.S-WER OF ROBERT ,v ARE STONE. 
The answer of Robert Ware Stone to a certain bill of com-
plaint exhibited against him and others in the Law and Equity 
Court, Part II, of the City of Richmond, Virginia, by Dorothy 
Stone Blackwell and others. 
For answer to the said bill of complaint or to so much 
thereof as he is advised that it is material that he should 
nnswer answers and says : 
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That he has executed a certain renunciation instrument 
bearing date on the 30th day of N8vember, 1939, a true copy 
is attached to the said bill of complaint, marked '' Exhibit 
C ''; that "the matters, facts, allegations and averments con-
tained in the said bill of complaint are true and that this re-
spondent, joins in the prayer of the said bill of complaint. 
And now having fully answered the said bill of complaint 
this respondent prays that he may be hence dismissed with 
his proper costs in this behalf expended. 
ROBERT \-V ARE STONE, Respondent. 
WILLIAM OLD, Coui1sel. 
page 19 ~ And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, 
held on the 9th day of M:arch, 1940. 
Dorothy Stone Blackwell, et als., Plaintiffs, 
against 
Virginia Trust Company, et als., Defendants. 
IN CHA:NCERY. 
It being represented that the defendant, Mary Frances Stone, 
is an infant under the age of twenty-one years, the Court 
doth assign Stuart A. Eacho, a discreet and competent attor-
ney at law practicing at the bar of this Court, as her guardian 
ad liteni to defend her interest herein. And thereupon came 
the said Stuart A. Eacho, guardian ad liteni as afore said and 
by leave of Court filed the answer of the said inf ant clef end-
ant by him as guardian ctd litem, and by consent, this cause is 
docketed and set for hearing as to the said infant defend-
ant. 
page 20 ~ 
Virginia: 
( 1940 March 9th-Filed.) 
In the Law and Equity Court, Part II, of the City of Rich-
mond. 
Dorothy Stone Blackwell, et als., Complainants, 
v. 
Virginia Trust Company, et als., Defendants. 
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.A.i,SWER. 
The joint and separate answers of Stuart A. Eacho, guard-
ian ad lit em for the infant defendant, :Mary Frances St(>ne, 
and the answer of the said infant defendant, Mary Frances 
Stone, by Stuart A. Eacho, her guardian ad litem, to a cer-
tain bill of complaint exhibited against the said l\Iary Frances 
Stone and others in the Law and Equity Court, Part II, of 
the City·of Richmond, by Dorothy Stone Blackwell and others. 
For answer to the said bill of complaint or to so much 
thereof as these respondents are advised that it is material 
that they should answer, answers and says: That the said 
guardian ad litem is not advised as to the matters and facts 
set forth in the said bill of complaint, and the said infant de-
fendant by her guardian ad lit em, answers and says that be-
ing an infant under the age of twenty-one years, she knows 
nothing of the matters and facts contained in the said bill 
of complaint, and that she com.mends her interests to the 
protection of the court and prays that no decree may be en-
tered to the prejudice of her interests, and now having an-
swered they pray, etc. 
page 21} 
STUART A. EACHO, 
Guardian ad litem. 
:MARY FRA'NOES STONE, 
By l\IARY FRANCIS STONE, 
Her guardian a,d litem. 
pag·e 22 } Aud at another day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, held on 
the 1st day of April, 1940. 
This day came the defendant, Virginia Trust' Company, 
Trustee, and by leave of Court filed its demurrer to the plain-
tiffs' bill, and the plaintiffs joined in the said demurrer, and 
the same is set down for argument. 
page 23} (1940 April 1st-Filed.) 
Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court, Part II, of the City of Rich~ 
mond. 
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Dorothy Stone Blackwell, Margaret Stone Wilkinson, Robert 
Joseph Stone, 
v. 
Virginia Trust Company, a domestic corporation, Rob.ert 
Ware Stone, John Letcher Stone, Herbert Stone, l\farian 
Stone, ·Wilbur Stone, John Letcher 'Stone, Jr. and Mary 
Frances Stone, an inf ant under the age of 21 years. 
DEMURRER. 
· The demurrer of Virgii1ia Trust Company, Trustee unde1· 
the deed and trust agreement with Anna Roberta Stone, dated 
August 14, 1924, to the bill of complaint of Dorothy Stone 
Blackwell, Margaret Stone W'illdnson and Robert Joseph 
Stone, plaintiffs. 
This defendant says that the bill filed in this cause is not 
sufficient in law, and especially in that: 
1. The renunciation by Robert ·ware Stone cannot be ef-
fective, as under the deed and trust agreement he has no es-
tate which can be renounced. 
page 24 ~ 2. The deed and trust agreement creates a trust 
which is, in its very nature, indestructible until the 
death of Robert Vf are Stone. 
3. The interests of the remaindermen cannot in any event 
be accelerated, as the deed and trust agreement manifests, 
by its terms, an intention of the creator which will be more 
nearly accomplished by the continuance of the trust without 
such acceleration. 
page 25 ~ And at another day, to-·wit: At a Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, held 
on the 31st day of May, 1940. 
This cause came on this day to be heard upon the bill of 
complaint taken for confessed as to John Letcher Stone, H cr-
bei·t Stone, Marian Stone, Wilbur Stone and John Letcher 
Stone, Jr., they having failed to appear and answer, plead 
or demur, upon the demurrer of the Virginia Trust Com-
pany, Trustee, the answer of Robert Ware Stone uniting in 
the prayer for relief, the answm· in proper person of Mary 
Frances Stone, an infant over the age of fourteen years~ thi::; 
day filed by leave of Court and the answer of Stuart A. Eacho. 
guardian ad litem. of Mary Frances Stone, an infant, to all 
of which answers the plaintiffs replied generally, and was 
argued by counsel. 
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On consideration whereof, the Court proceeding first to pass 
upon the demurrer, for reasons set forth in writing and now 
made a part of the record, is of the opinion that so- much of 
the bill as prays for a division of the trust subject into two 
parts is sufficient in law and doth overrule the demurrer to 
the said bill. 
And the Court now proceeding to pass upon the merits of 
the case., upon the bill and answers, is of the opinion for rea-
sons above referred to and made a part of the record, and 
doth adjudg·e, order and decree that the plaintiffs are not en-
titled to have their remainder in the one-half in-
page 26 ~ terest of Robert Ware Stone in the trust subject 
accelerated and paid over to them at this time, but 
that the Virginia Trust Company, as Trustee aforesaid~ shall 
continue to pay to Robert Ware Stone until his natural death 
the net income arising from his one-half interest in said trust 
estate. · 
The Court is further of the opinion that the plaintiffs at 
present have no standing· in Court and no right to insist on 
a division of the trust estate, yet, inasmuch as the answer of 
Robert Ware Stone unites in all of the prayers for relief con-
tained in the bill, his prayer should be recognized and doth 
adjudge, order and decree that the Virginia Trust Company, 
Trustee under the Deed and Trust Agreement dated the l 4th 
day of August, 1927, more particularly referred to in the bill, 
do proceed with convenient speed to divide the trust estate 
into two equal parts or shares and hold and dispose of the 
same as directed in paragraph 7, clauses (a), (b), (c) and 
( d) of the said Deed and Trust Agreement. 
page 27 ~ 
Virginia: 
( 1940 ~fay 31st--Filecl) 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part 
Two 
Dorothy Stone Blackwell, et als. 
V. 
Virginia Trust Company, et als. 
" MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT UPON A DEMURRER 
BY THE VIRGINIA TRUST COMP ANY 
The bill alleges that Anna Roberta Stone entered into a 
r•ertain deed and trust agreement with the Virginia Trust 
Company which provided for a life estate in Anna Roberta 
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Stone in the income from the property which was the subject 
matter of said deed, and upon her death, the property should 
be divided into two equal shares or parts to be held and dis-
posed of as follows : 
•' (a) It shall pay over the net income arising from one 
such equal part or share to my son, John L. Stone, should he 
survive me, for and during· the term of his natural life, and 
at his ¢leath, ( or at my death, should he not survive me) to 
pay arid deliver over the principal of such part or share dis-
charged of all trust, to and among· his children, in equal 
shares, the issue of any deceased child of his to take the 
parent's share by right of representation; 
"(b) To pay over the net income arising from the other 
such equal part of share to my son, the said Robert W .. Stone, 
should he survive me, for and during the term of his· natural 
life, and at death ( or at my death, should he not survive me) 
pay and deliver over the principal of such part or ·share, dis-
charged of all trust, to and among his children, in equal 
shares ; the issue of any deceased child of his to 
page 28 ~ take the parent's share by right of representation; 
"(c) And in the event that either of my said 
sons should die without leaving issue, then I do direct that 
the share 01· part of said trust estate which otherwise would 
havP been paid and delivered over to his issue at his death, 
as aforesaid, Hhnll, at the death of such son, be paid and de-
livered over, discharged of all trust, to his brother, should his 
brother survive him; and if not, then such share or part shall 
be paid nnd cfolivered over discharged of all trust, to the 
children of imeb brother, in equal shares; the issue of any 
deceased child of his to take the parent's share by right of 
l'epresenta tion; 
'' (d) And I, the said Anua R. Stone, do particularly charge 
nnd direct, and tlie right of my said sons respectively to have 
and receive the income provided for them in the foregoing· 
tnu:it is conditioned as ·follows: That neither of my said 
sons shall assip:n, anticipate or alienate the said income to 
which they are respectively entitled, under the preceding 
trusts, or anv part thereof; and that the same shall not be 
subject to nttachment, seizure or sequestration by their cred-
itors. by any legal process or procedure whatsoever; and 
that if, at any time~ either of mr said sons shall attempt to 
assi~·n. anticipate or alienate said income, or any part thereof, 
01· shall l1ecome a hankrunt, or an attempt shall be made bv 
nny creditor of either of my said ~ons to attach, seize or 
Reqnestratc said income, then the rig:ht of such son to receive 
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such income shall thereupon absolutely· cease for the re-
mainder of his natural life and the said trustee shall there-
upon apply the same for the support, maintenance and benefit 
of such son, in any manner it may deem best, and the ex-
penditure of the trustee for such purposes shall not be sub-
ject to dispute or question by such son, or any other person 
whatsoever;'' · 
The Virginia Trust Company ,vas a party to said instru-
ment and accepted the trust and covenanted to execute the 
same with all due fidelitv. 
The said Anna Roberta Stone, the creator of the trust and 
the first life tenant, has departed this life. Both the said 
John L. Stone and the said Robert W. Stone, the parties men-
tioned in clauses (a) and (b) above quoted, are living and 
each of them has children living. 
page 29 ~ Subsequent to the death of .Anna Roberta Stone, 
the creator of the said trust quote_d from above, 
Robert Ware Stone, who is the same as Robert W. · Stone 
named in clause (b), under his hand and seal executed an 
instrument dated the 6th day of J anuury, 1940, in which he 
forever r~nounced and disclaimed all right, title, interest and 
estate in and to the said trust created i.n the instrument above 
referred to whether principal or interest, reciting that it was 
his intention to eliminate any particular estate of whatever 
nature which he might have in the said trust as effectively as 
llis death would terminate and eliminate the same. 
Prior to the execution of this so-called renunciation and 
disclaimer, the said Robert Ware Stone for some years had 
accepted the said trust and received his share of the income 
a rising· therefrom. 
This bill is filed by Dorothy Stone Blackwell, :Margaret 
Stone ,vmrinson and Robert Joseph Stone, three of the four 
childre11 of Robert Ware Stone. Thev make as defendants 
the Virginia Tmst Company, Robert Ware Stone, John 
Letcher Stone. Herbert Stone, Wilbur Stone, Marian Stone, 
and ,Jolm Letcher Stone, Jr., the last four being the children 
of the .John Letcher Stone mentioned in clau~e (a) of the 
trust. The bill also names as a defendant, Mary Frances 
Stone. an infant under the age of twenty-one years, who is 
the sister of the three complainants. 
Th~ bill alleg·es that bv reason of the said renunciation and· 
rlisclaimer, Ro,bert Ware· Stone has terminated and eliminated 
l1is particular estate in one-half of the property named in the 
trust, and that this lmlf of tl1e estate now stands 
png-e 30 ~ in the same position it would be had he died. They 
claim that said renunciation and disclaimer has 
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accelerated the estate in remainder to his children and that 
they are now entitled to have the Virginia Trust Company 
pay over to the complainants and their sister, Mary Frances 
Stone, the principal or corpus of one-half of the ,mid estate 
embraced in the trust agreement. They allege that they have 
delivered a c9py of the renunciation to the Virginia Trust 
Compauy·ihd made demand upon it to tum over to them the 
said estate· .and that said demand has been refused. The 
prayer of the bill is that the Virginia Trust Company, Trus-
tee, be directed to divide the trust into two equal parts and 
deliver to the children of Robert Ware Stone their inter-
ests. 
The Virginia Trust Company demurs to the said bill, and 
the gTound for its demurrer sets up that the renunciation by 
Robert "rare Stone is not effective as he has no estate which 
can be renounced, that the trust created in the said instru-
ment is h1destructible until the death of Robert ·ware Stone, 
and that the interests of the remaindermen cannot be ac-
celerated as the instrument itself shows an intention of the 
creator to continue the trust without acceleration. 
In the solution of this problem, there is involved the law 
bearing· upon conting:Pnt remainderg, the doctrine of accelera-
tion, the consttuction of the instrument creating· the trust, 
and, to a slight extent, the law of spendthrift trust~. 
In their zeal and diligence, counsel have brought 
pag-e 31 ~ to the Court's attention many cases from other 
states. In t11e view taken by the Court, secondary 
authority is hardly necessary. The decisions of our own 
Court and the statute law of Virginia settle every question 
involved. 
The law will be found in: 
Code of Virginia, ~5153 
Code of Virginia, ~5157 
Comvton v. RixeJJ'.c; Exor .• 124 Va. 548 
America.n Nat'l Bank v. Chap-in, mo Va. 1 
Sherir:lan v. Krouse, 161 Va. 873 
The first question to be decided is wl1en does the remainder 
(after the termination of the life estate of Robert W. Stone) 
vest. And inseparabfo from this question is who are the 
parties that fit tl1e description of those to whom this remainder 
was given. 
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(1) 
Code Section 5153 reads: 
"Every limitation in a deed or will contingent upon the 
dying of any person without heirs, or heirs of the body, or 
issue, * * * shall be construed a limitation to take effect when 
such person' shall die not having such heir or issue * '*' * liv-
ing at the time of his death, or born to him within ten months 
thereafter, unless the intention of such limitation be other-
wise plainly declared on the face of the deed or will creating 
it.'' ( Italics supplied.) 
Applying this statutory rule, it becomes necessary to await 
the death of Robert vV. Stone to determine who are his chil-
dren. At present he has four. vVho can say that at his death 
there will not be five, six, seven or even more children of Rob-
ert W. Stone to share this remainder. How would these after-
born children receive their shares if the Court should now pay 
the entire share over in equal parts to the four ... 
page 32 ~ children now in esse? 
vVho can say that at the death of Robert W. 
Stone there will be any issue of his surviving? In such an 
event or contingency, this share would, under clause ( c ), pass 
to John L. Stone· or his children. · 
In addition to the rule cited in Code Section 5113, the lan-
guage of clauses (a), (h) and (c) plainly" shows the descrip-
tion of those who take the remainder can only be found at 
the deatl1 of Robert W. Stone. 
The remainder after the termination of the particular es-
tate of Robert ,v. Stone is a contingent one-conting·ent in 
two aspects, namely; (a) that he should leave more children 
than the present four now in esse, and (b) that he might sur-
vive all llis issue. 
As said ill Compton v. Rixey's Exor., .c;uprt.i, tnem can be 
no acceleration of a contingent remainder until the happen-
ing of the contingency. True, where the contingency is the 
death of a life tenant, the courts have been liberal in holding 
that whatever terminated the life estate is equivalent to the 
death of the life tenant. But this is based upon the 'presumed 
jntention of the testator, and if such intention is not war-
ranted by the langua.~;e of the will, construed in the light of 
Rurrounding circumstances, acceleration will not be per-
mitted. 
Tl1e Court in that case said that acceleration has been most 
frequently allowed in those instances where the widow has 
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renounced the provisions of her husband's will and in lieu 
thereof claimed what the law allowed her, thereby disturbing 
his scheme of distribution and disappointing other 
page 33 ~ ..b~neficiaries under the will. Under these circum-
stances, the courts have found a presumed intention 
on the part of _the testator that the renunciation was the 
equivalent of her death. · 
This is the distinguishing feature between Comvtnn v. 
Rixey's Exor. and American NatfonaJ., Bank v. Chapin, suvra. 
In the former, acceleration was not allowed. In the latter, it 
was. The opinions in both cases.abound in such expressions as: 
( some are quotations by our Court from other courts) : 
"* * * the doctrine is only applied in furtherance, or in 
execution of the presumed intention of the testator. It is 
never applied to defeat a testator's intention.'·' 
'' But even where the remainder is vested, it does not neces-
sarily follow that the time of enjoyment will be accelerated. 
We are still to seek to ascertain the intention of the testator 
from his will, read as a whole, and acceleration may not 
comport with that intent." 
'' Of course, an intent that there shall be no acceleration 
may be shown by inevitable implication * $ * where t11e eo11-
ting·ency upon which the remaindermen are to take is such 
that in the nature of things the person entitled can be ascer-
tained only by the physical death of the widow.'' 
·' The doctrine of acceleration of estates is founded upon 
the desire of courts of equity to give effect to the manifest 
intention of the testator, and when such intention would ·be 
frustrated by allowing· it, it will be denied.'' 
"• * :!< this doctrine of acceleration, however, is not an 
arbitrary one, but is founded on the presumed intention of 
the testator." 
'' The true doctrine is that tl1cre can be no acceleration 
of a· contingent estate from any cause or occasion not ex-
nressly or impliedly contemplated or intended by the person 
creating· the estate." 
,vbat, tben, was the intention of the creator of this trustt 
It is not onlv relevant but higl1ly important to 
pag·e 34 ~ consider wlrn were the ~nedal objects of her bounty 
and her solicitude. S11e not onlv made provision 
for her sonR hut mRde proyision n2"ainst their own improvi-
rlen<>P and indisc.reHons. In othn words. in creatirn!' a ~ptmd-
+luift trust. she was nrotectin!! tl1em aQ'Ainst themselve~. Her 
intention was to make a provision for l1er sons of which, clur-
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ing· their lives, neither they nor anyone else could deprive 
them. 
Anna Roberta Stone, the creator of this trust, was the 
owner in fee simple of the property embraced therein. As 
such, she had a rig·ht to dispose of it upon such terms and 
with such restrictions and limitations as she saw fit so long 
as she did not violate some positive rule of law or public 
policy. As said in Browning v. Bluegrass, etc., 153 Va. 31, 
35, "So long as no law is violated, a man may do what he 
pleases with his own.'', and '' The donor may select his con-
duit and indicate the manner in which the power must be 
executed.'' Anna Roberta Stone created what is commonly 
known as a spendthrift trust, permitted under Code Section 
5157. From a reading of the trust instrument, it is evident 
she intended to provide ag·ainst her son divesting himself in 
any manner of the provision she made for him. The thought 
controlling her was not that the son was to be prevented from 
divesting himself in some particular manner leaving another 
way open for him to do so. Her thougllt was to prevent her 
son from divesting himself in any way of a support so long 
as he lived. She was not interested in methods of transferring 
title to property. S_he was concerned with a re-
page 35 } sult she ~rishe.d to prevent. It is of little conse-
quence, then, in arriving· at her intention, to stress 
the fact that while prohibiting him '' to assign, anticipate or 
alienate", she did not also prohibit him from "renouncing''. 
Her object is so obvious that if necessary, the Court should 
supplv t]1is latter word as necessary to completely effectuate 
l1er intention. The creator of this trust was protecting the 
hcmefieiarv from himself. This is the main purpose in every 
Rnen<ltl1rift trust, and if the beneficiarv can frustrate that 
obiect, there would be little use in creating spendthrift trusts. 
The Vir~inia Trust Oomp3:ny accepted said trust. and 
covenanted to carry out it~ provisions. It is, therefore, its 
,lntv to resist anv act or efforts of anv parties to frm,trate 
the intention of the creator of the trust: Robert W. Stone ac-
ripnted the provisions of said trust and for years enjoyed 
tl1e income. In accepting its provisions, he did not accept 
tl1em in nart, but i,n. toto, and is bound by his acceptance to 
Pniov snirl trust as the creator intended, and any act of hiR 
Rttf\rnptinµ: to frustrate such intention is beyond his power. 
The income as it accrued became his. Before it accrued, 
;t was an inchoate ri~ht. He mig·ht refuse today to accept 
fhe 9ccruecl income. Rnt if he <"hanges hi~ mind tomorrow and 
;i:; willing· to accept it, it should he available. 
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In 26 R. C. L., page 1211, paragraph 53, the law is stated 
thus: 
page 36 ~ "• * * But when the object of the trust has not 
been attained as where it is to pay the income to 
tlie beneficiaries until they reach a certain age, the· bene-
ficiaries have no right to terminate it before that time." 
In Bogert on- Trusts and Trustees, Vol. 1, page 751, §227, 
this is said: 
'' * * * Until the iIJcome is actually paid into the hands 
of the cesf'wi or his agent, no coins, bills or credit are owned 
by him. He merely has his equitable rig·ht that the trustee 
pay l1im by the use of money or credit. It is the essence of 
the spendthrift trust that this equitable right is not vohm-
tari.ly alienable. * ~ * '' 
'' If a E!pendthrift trust were destructible, the settlor 's de-
sire to protect the cestiti would be unsatisfied, and frequently 
indirect alienation could be effected. Those courts which 
have sanctioned spendthrift trusts have .been very jealous 
of attempts to end them." 
It is ur!?,'ed that his remmeiation is neither an assignment 
· nor an alienation. If he were to renounce todav and tomor-
row disclaim his_ renunciation, who is there who 
0
has acquired 
any contra()tual rights to oppose it. If contractual rights 
have intervened, the instrument would amount to an assign-
ment. If it should be termed a gift as to all future income, 
it was an incomplete gift and· liable to be revoked at any 
time. 
TI1e re~unc1ation is a model of novelty and ingenuity and, 
as admitted by counsel, was~ in the main, copied from the 
instrument in Compton v. Rixey'.c; Exo.r., supra, and it is 
claimed that that case is authority for its validity and effect. 
It was not necessary in that case to pass upon the effect of, 
tl1is instrument. The Court ruled that the estate in remainder 
beiug· contin!rent and the ultimate remaindermen unascertain-
able until Mrs. Rixey's deat11, acceleration was not 
pag·e 37 ~ allowable. From a close reading of the opinion, 
it does not appear t11at the effect of this instru-
ment anvwhere received the deliberate consideration of the 
Court. It must not. be confused with those cases where the 
donee has refused to ever accept title or a gift. In this case, 
the donee has accepted, an<l the title vested in him. How, 
then, can he divest ]1imself. Under Code Section 5141, such 
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an estate can only be conveyed by deed or will. The instru-
ment, to say the least, is of doubtful import. 
In Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Vol. 1, page 504, §173, 
the law is thus stated: 
"While in nearly all cases the cestui will doubtless desire 
to accept the trust, if he should for any reason desire to re-
ject, he has the undoubted power to do so. When first noti-
fied of the trust, he has the election between acceptance and 
disclaimer. He doubtless has a reasonable time in which to 
make up his mind, and during this period cannot be held to 
have rejected or accepted. Once he has manifested his atti-
tude toward the trust by unequivocal acceptance, he cannot 
thereafter disclaim. If he wishes to be freed of his equitable 
property, he must find someone willing· to take a transfer 
of it for a consideration oi" by way of gift. * * * '' 
As stated above, Robert "\V. Stone for years had accepted 
the benefits under this trust so there can be no question about 
his election as to accepting. the trust. 
The Court is of the opinion, -therefore, that the estate of 
the remaindermen is not accelerated for two reasons, first, be-
cause to do so would frustrate the intention of the creator of 
the trust by dissolving· a spendthrift trust set up by her for 
her son to be enjoyed by him during his entire lifetime, and, 
second, because the remainder is contingent, and 
page 38 ~ only at the death of Robert W. Stone will the Court 
be able to ascertain what person or persons fit the 
description of the remaind·ermcn. Only at the death of Rob-
ert W. Stone can it be determined whether lie dies without 
leaving· any issue or whether he leaves more children than 
tlie four now in esse. 
The bill charges that the estate has never been divided 
into two equal parts as directed by paragraph 7 of the trust 
agreement and prays that the Court wil1 require this to be 
done. To this extent, the bill is good, but in all other respects 
the demurrer of the Virginia Trust Company should be sus-
tained. 
FRANK T. SUTTON, JR. 
Apr. 30th, 1940. 
page :-19 ~ I, Lutl1er Libby, Clerk of tl1e Law and Equity 
Court of the Citv of Richmond. Part Two. do here-
by certify that the foregoing is a true transcript of so much 
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of the record as was agreed between counsel for the plaintiff 
and defendant should be copied in the a.bove entitled case 
wherein Dorothy Stone Blackwell, et als. are complainants 
_and Virginia Trust Company, et als. defendants, and that 
the defendants had due notice of the intention of the com-
plainants to apply for such transcript. 
Witness my band this 7th day of June, ,1940. 
LUTHER LIBBY, Clerk. 
Fee for record $15.00. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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